For nearly seven years, the First Step Act has stood as one of the most ambitious criminal justice reforms in recent history, promising to reward rehabilitation with earlier release and a smoother transition back into society. Yet the law’s implementation has been anything but straightforward. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has struggled to operationalize a complex system of earned-time credits, leaving inmates, attorneys, and even courts grappling with inconsistent interpretations and uneven application. For incarcerated individuals, the stakes are profound. Time credits can mean the difference between months or years in custody versus a chance to rebuild life outside prison walls. A recent appellate decision provides much-needed clarity, while also drawing a firm boundary around what those credits can and cannot accomplish.
The case, Rivera-Perez v. Stover, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addresses a question that has divided courts across the country: whether earned time credits under the First Step Act can be used not only to accelerate release from prison, but also to reduce the length of supervised release. The answer, according to the Second Circuit, is ‘NO.’ While credits can move an individual more quickly out of prison and into prerelease custody or supervised release, they cannot shorten the supervised release, oversight by U.S. Probation after the incarceration, term itself.
To understand the significance of this ruling, it is important to revisit the structure of the First Step Act. Enacted in 2018, the law created a system that allows eligible federal inmates to earn time credits by participating in evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and productive activities. These credits were designed as incentives, encouraging individuals to engage in programming that reduces the likelihood of reoffending. In theory, the more programming an inmate completes, the more credits they earn, and the sooner they can transition out of prison.
In practice, however, the rollout has been fraught with difficulty. The BOP has faced criticism for delays in implementing the risk and needs assessment system, inconsistent calculation of credits, and limited availability of qualifying programs. Many inmates have accumulated credits that were not timely applied, while others have struggled to access the programming required to earn them in the first place. Litigation has become a primary mechanism for resolving disputes over how credits should be calculated and applied, underscoring the gap between legislative intent and administrative execution.
Rivera-Perez’s case illustrates these challenges vividly. He had earned more than 700 days of First Step Act credits, yet only a portion of those credits had been applied to advance his placement into prerelease custody. The remainder sat unused, prompting him to file a habeas petition alleging that the BOP had miscalculated his credits and improperly delayed his transfer. By the time the case reached the courts, he had already been moved to a residential reentry center, raising the question of whether any meaningful relief remained available.
The district court took an expansive view of the statute, concluding that unused credits should be applied to reduce Rivera-Perez’s term of supervised release. We should note, a district court judge has the authority to reduce a term of supervised release for any number of reasons but usually terms are shortened when further supervision is unwarranted. This interpretation was rooted in a straightforward reading of the statutory language, which states that earned time credits “shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.” The district court reasoned that applying credits “toward” supervised release naturally meant reducing the amount of time spent under supervision.
The Second Circuit disagreed. In a detailed statutory analysis, the court concluded that the phrase “applied toward” does not authorize a reduction in supervised release but instead refers to accelerating the start of that period. In other words, credits can move a person closer to supervised release by shortening their time in prison, but they cannot be used to shorten the supervised release term once it begins.
This distinction is more than semantic. It reflects a fundamental difference in how the law conceptualizes incarceration versus post-release supervision. The court emphasized that supervised release is a sentence imposed by a judge, not an administrative condition managed by the BOP. As such, any reduction in supervised release must occur through judicial mechanisms, such as early termination under existing statutes, rather than through the application of administrative credits.
The court also highlighted the broader statutory framework. The First Step Act ties the application of time credits to a transfer process governed by another provision, which allows eligible prisoners to begin supervised release earlier, but caps that acceleration at twelve months. Reading the statute as a whole, the court found that Congress intended credits to reduce time spent in prison, not to alter the length of supervised release imposed by a sentencing court.
For inmates, this ruling carries significant implications. Many had hoped that accumulated credits could be used not only to leave prison earlier, but also to reduce the duration of post-release supervision. That expectation is now foreclosed, at least within the Second Circuit. Credits can still provide meaningful benefits by advancing release dates and increasing access to prerelease custody, but they stop short of eliminating or shortening the obligations that follow incarceration.
The decision also underscores a broader reality about the First Step Act. While the law offers powerful incentives, it does not operate as a comprehensive sentence reduction mechanism. Its primary function is to shift time from prison to less restrictive forms of custody, not to erase judicially imposed terms. This distinction may be frustrating for those who have invested significant effort in programming, only to find that their credits have limited downstream impact.
At the same time, the court’s reasoning reflects concerns about consistency and statutory coherence. Allowing credits to reduce supervised release could create disparities and undermine the structured process that governs sentencing and post-release supervision. It could also bypass the role of judges, who are required to consider a range of factors before modifying a sentence. By limiting the application of credits to earlier release from prison, the court preserved the balance between administrative incentives and judicial authority.
The ruling also brings some measure of clarity to a system that has been marked by uncertainty. Different courts have reached different conclusions on this issue, leading to inconsistent outcomes for similarly situated inmates. The Second Circuit’s decision aligns with a growing consensus among several circuits, even as debate continues in others. For practitioners and inmates alike, the decision provides a clearer framework for understanding how credits will be applied moving forward.
Still, clarity does not resolve the underlying challenges of implementation. The BOP must continue to address issues related to program availability, credit calculation, and timely application. Without consistent and transparent administration, even well-defined legal standards can fail to deliver meaningful relief. The promise of the First Step Act depends not only on judicial interpretation, but also on effective execution.
For those currently incarcerated, the message is mixed. Participation in recidivism reduction programs remains valuable and can lead to earlier release from prison. But the benefits of those efforts have limits. Supervised release, with its conditions and duration, remains largely intact unless modified through separate judicial processes. In practical terms, this means that while inmates can accelerate their transition out of prison, they cannot use First Step Act credits to shorten the period during which they remain under supervision.
From a policy perspective, the decision raises important questions about the design of incentives. If credits cannot reduce supervised release, their value may diminish for inmates who have already maximized their ability to shorten incarceration. Whether Congress intended this outcome, or whether further legislative refinement is needed, remains an open question. What is clear is that the current framework places a ceiling on the tangible benefits of participation, even as it continues to encourage engagement in rehabilitative programming.
Ultimately, Rivera-Perez v. Stover is a reminder that reform is often an iterative process. The First Step Act represented a significant step forward, but its implementation has revealed gaps and ambiguities that courts are now working to resolve. Each decision adds another piece to the puzzle, shaping how the law operates in practice and how its promises are realized.
For inmates navigating this system, clarity is critical. Understanding what credits can and cannot do is essential for making informed decisions about participation in programming and planning for reentry. While this decision may limit certain expectations, it also provides a more predictable framework, reducing the uncertainty that has characterized the early years of the First Step Act.
In the end, the law continues to evolve. The challenges of implementation, the role of the Bureau of Prisons, and the balance between administrative incentives and judicial authority will remain central issues. As courts continue to interpret the statute and policymakers consider potential adjustments, the goal remains the same: to create a system that rewards rehabilitation, reduces recidivism, and provides a fair and effective path from incarceration to community reintegration.
Follow me on LinkedIn or Twitter or Forbes. Check out my website or some of my other work here.
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
